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REGULATING AT THE MARGINS:
NON-TRADITIONAL KINSHIP AND THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF INTIMATE AND FAMILY LIFE
Courtney Megan Cahill*

This Article offers a new theory of how the law attempts to control intimate and
family life and uses that theory to argue why certain laws might be
unconstitutional. Specifically, it contends that by regulating non-traditional
relationships and practices that receive little or no constitutional protection—
same-sex relationships, domestic partnerships, de facto parenthood, and nonsexual procreation—the law is able to express its normative ideals about all
marriage, parenthood, and procreation. By regulating non-traditional kinship,
then, the law can be aspirational in a way that the Constitution would ordinarily
prohibit and can attempt to channel all of us in ways that satisfy its normative
ideals. This Article refers to this form of channeling or control as “back door”
regulation, and maintains that by regulating at the margins, the law attempts to
regulate everyone. In addition to offering a new theory of the family and its legal
regulation, this Article uses that theory to enrich constitutional challenges to laws,
like exclusionary marriage regimes, that selectively burden non-traditional
intimacy and practices. Most broadly, it invites readers to consider how far the
law reaches when it regulates as well as just how interconnected to one another
the law’s regulation (and discrimination) makes us.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, scenario “A,” a white man
uses an online dating service to meet a woman whom he would like to marry
someday. Because the man is interested in eventually having white children with
his wife, he checks “Caucasian” in the list of criteria provided by the service.
Despite his desire to marry one white woman, the man routinely has unprotected
sex with many women.
The state in which the man lives passes two laws related to his activities.
The first law provides that online dating services shall be subject to a sin-orsumptuary tax when they organize patrons on the basis of racial and ethnic
background. The second law provides that a man commits a misdemeanor when he
engages in unprotected sex with a woman other than his wife. In support of each
law, the state cites antidiscrimination and health concerns, respectively. As to the
health issue, the state is particularly concerned about the possibility that men will
father many children who will not know each other, thus raising the specter of
incest. The man challenges both laws in federal court, arguing that they violate his
associational and privacy rights under the Federal Constitution, and likely wins.1

1.
The law that taxes online dating services that organize patrons on the basis of
racial and ethnic background likely violates patrons’ right to associational freedom under
the First Amendment and the so-called freedom of intimate association under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. For a description of the latter right, see Kenneth L. Karst, The
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In the second scenario, scenario “B,” a white woman wants to have a
child with her Hispanic female partner. They retain the services of the California
Cryobank, the largest sperm bank in the world and located in California, and
choose donor # 02493, a Hispanic male who has already successfully donated to
four families. The woman and her partner select a Hispanic male because they are
interested in having a child that shares their ethnic heritage. For this and other
reasons, donor # 02493 is the perfect donor for them.
Before the woman purchases # 02493, however, California passes two
laws that relate to her activities. The first law places a large sin-or-sumptuary tax
on sperm banks, like the California Cryobank, that organize donors on the basis of
racial and ethnic background. The second law provides that it is a misdemeanor for
sperm banks to sell donor sperm to more than three families or individuals who
successfully bear children with that donor. The state cites antidiscrimination and
health concerns in support of the laws. As to the health issue, California, like the
state in A, is particularly concerned about the possibility of accidental incest
between the biologically related siblings of popular sperm bank donors—siblings
who likely will not know each other. It is worth noting that B is not just a
hypothetical case, as commentators have started to argue that sperm banks should
be regulated for just the reasons discussed here: to prevent incest and to promote
race neutrality.2
As a result of the sin tax, the Cryobank starts to charge its customers
considerably higher rates for donor sperm. The high cost of Cryobank sperm, as
well as the fact that # 02493 is now off limits because he has already helped create
children in four families, force the woman to seek the services of a sperm bank in
another state (even though # 02493 was the perfect match). The woman challenges
California’s laws on federal constitutional grounds, arguing that they violate her
right to procreate, and likely loses.3
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). Similarly, the law that makes it
a misdemeanor for a man to have sexual relations with a woman who is not his wife is a
criminal fornication law—a law that punishes extramarital sexual activity. While the
Supreme Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of criminal fornication
laws, it indirectly ruled on their constitutionality in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). If, after Lawrence, it is constitutional to deny same-sex couples the ability to marry
(as Lawrence itself suggests, see id. at 585) but unconstitutional to impose criminal
penalties on them for engaging in consensual sex (as Lawrence explicitly holds, see id.),
then it would seem that fornication laws must be unconstitutional because they criminalize
the only kind of sexual activity (extramarital) that same-sex couples in most states can
engage in. In Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005), the Virginia Supreme Court
agreed when it struck down that state’s criminal fornication statute in light of Lawrence.
2.
See infra Part II.C.
3.
In this case, no sexual autonomy rights are at issue because the woman is
reproducing in a non-sexual way. She might argue that her associational rights are being
violated here—specifically, her right to associate with the reproductive material of her
choice. It is unlikely, however, that a court would look favorably on that claim given its
somewhat attenuated relationship to associational autonomy. Thus, the woman in B is left
with her right to procreate, which, according to Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
and its progeny, receives constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Court decided Skinner on equality grounds, it has suggested in subsequent
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What is going on here? Most obviously, perhaps, the man in A likely
wins because he is engaging in constitutionally protected activity (sex) and in
something (online dating) that not only involves associational autonomy but also
might lead to constitutionally protected activity (sex and marriage). By contrast,
the woman in B likely loses because she is engaging in neither of those things.
Instead, hers is a non-sexual, and non-traditional, form of procreation that arguably
neither constitutes a fundamental right4 nor involves the same sort of activity that
we typically associate with the constitutionally protected activities of sexual
reproduction and romantic affiliation. As one commentator recently put it,
“Autonomy interests are implicated differently in assisted reproduction . . . than
they are in sexual reproduction or romantic dating.”5 It therefore follows that the
activity at issue in B can likely be subject to regulations that would surely be
unconstitutional when applied to the activity at issue in A.
But something else is going on here—something more than a simple case
of government subjecting B to regulation in a way that would violate the
Constitution if applied to A because B is non-traditional and therefore “not the
stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made.”6 That
is, if we simply read these scenarios as exemplifying a case where non-traditional
activity (B) can be burdened in a way that traditional activity (A) cannot be, then
we miss something important: the extent to which the law might be using B to

cases that Skinner protects a fundamental right to procreate. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). However, while Skinner established a right to
procreate, what that procreative right actually encompasses remains highly contested. See,
e.g., Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1135 (2008) (arguing for a “bundle of rights” theory of procreation). The right does not
necessarily include the right to procreate via third-party assistance. See Radhika Rao,
Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1483–89 (1995). For the argument
that the right to procreate includes the right to noncoital procreation, see John A. Robertson,
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 914 (1996)
[hereinafter Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology] (“Since an infertile couple or
individual has the same interest in bearing and rearing offspring as a fertile couple does,
their right to use noncoital techniques to treat infertility should have equivalent respect.”);
John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 323, 328 (2005) (“If coital reproduction is protected, then we might
reasonably expect the courts to protect the right of infertile persons to use noncoital means
of reproduction to combine their gametes, such as artificial insemination.”). Still, even if the
woman in B has a right to noncoital procreation, it is unclear whether that right includes the
right to a sperm donor of her choice. For an argument that it does, see John A. Robertson,
Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 956 n.53 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos] (“The recipient
of [sperm] donation . . . may have the full procreative interest, even if the donor does not.
Thus, persons desiring to reproduce may have a right to receive gametes and gestation from
others, even if the others have no independent right to provide those services.”).
4.
See supra note 3.
5.
Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification and Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE
L.J. 1844, 1882 (2009). Fox’s argument is set forth in greater detail below. See infra notes
95–96 and accompanying text.
6.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989).
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articulate normative ideals about what all intimate and family life ought to look
like.
In more concrete terms, constitutional guarantees prohibit the law from
directly forcing the man in A to procreate in race-neutral ways and from directly
setting limits on the number of times that he “donates” sperm to women. Those
guarantees do not, however, prohibit the law from regulating the similar nontraditional activity at issue in B because B, unlike A, is not constitutionally
protected. Nor, importantly, do those guarantees prohibit the law from using the
legal regulation of B as an opportunity to express its strong normative
commitments regarding all procreation—including the traditional procreative
activity in A that is constitutionally protected. When viewed in this light, B
presents an occasion for the law to articulate normative ideals for everyone. It is in
this scenario that the law’s thick normative commitments regarding all
procreation—in this case, the law’s belief that procreation should be race neutral
and incest preventative—find expression.
This Article provides a new theory of the family that has both descriptive
and practical importance. Its general goal is to offer a novel way to think about
how the law attempts to control intimate and familial life and to establish an ideal
conception of it. Its narrow objective is to use that theory as a basis for arguing
why certain regulations, like those imposed on same-sex partners or on alternative
procreation, might be unconstitutional.
More specifically, this Article argues that non-traditional kinship presents
an occasion for the law to articulate its normative vision of all intimate and family
life, including reproduction, romantic affiliation, and family formation. Notably,
family law has overlooked this phenomenon because of the conventional way in
which it conceptualizes the connection between traditional and non-traditional
relationships and practices. For instance, family law approaches the traditional
nuclear family and the non-traditional marginal family as if they occupy distinct
and separate domains.7 Moreover, it assumes that the marginal family is dominated
by and subsidiary to its central counterpart—or, to use a metaphor often invoked
by family law commentators, it assumes that non-traditional kinship sits in the
“shadow” of traditional kinship.8 Finally, it assumes that the marginal family is
highly regulated by the state, whereas the central family, protected as it is by
constitutional privacy guarantees, is rarely subject to regulation.9
Thinking about the family and its legal regulation in this way is
problematic for two reasons. First, family law’s conventional understanding of the
relationship between traditional and non-traditional kinship is descriptively
inaccurate. It approaches those kinship forms as separate and distinct, when, in
fact, they are dynamically interrelated. Moreover, it assumes that marginal kinship
is dominated by traditional models, when, in fact, marginal kinship helps to define
those models. And it presupposes that traditional kinship is never regulated, when,
in fact, the law regulates it all the time—albeit indirectly at the margins. This
7.
8.
9.

See infra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
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Article contends that when the law uses marginality to articulate a normative
vision of intimate and family life, it is regulating through the “back door” that
which the Constitution prohibits it from regulating directly—namely, traditional
kinship. Viewed in this light, the law’s regulation of marginal kinship constitutes
an underhanded way to gain access to traditional forms of intimate and family life
that the Constitution staunchly protects—the very definition of a “back door.”10
Second, family law’s conventional narrative has certain practical costs,
particularly for those interested in challenging the constitutionality of laws that
burden non-traditional intimacy and family life, such as exclusionary marriage
laws. That narrative overlooks the extent to which the law uses non-traditional
kinship as a vehicle through which to express a normative vision of kinship for
everyone. As a result, advocates have missed the opportunity to make a novel
constitutional argument: that the law imposes expressive or normative burdens on
non-traditional kinship and that those expressive or normative burdens sometimes
(although not always) amount to a constitutional equality violation.
Part I sets forth family law’s conventional view of the relationship
between traditional and non-traditional kinship. Part II challenges that view by
focusing on a number of instances from the family law context where the law uses
marginality to express strong normative commitments about intimate and family
life generally. Part III builds on these illustrations to demonstrate that the law uses
marginality to try to regulate everyone; as such, it would not be improper to think
about the legal regulation of non-traditional kinship as an attempt to regulate even
traditional kinship, albeit through the back door. Finally, Part IV contemplates
some of the practical uses to which this Article’s descriptive theory of the family
and its legal regulation may be put, including the ways in which it might be used to
enrich constitutional challenges to regulations that burden marginal kinship,
including, but not limited to, exclusionary marriage regimes.
Commentators have long theorized the relationship between traditional
and non-traditional models in American family law. Some commentators argue
that traditional models, like marriage, are constraining; under this view, those
models overshadow non-traditional kinship to such a degree that the latter is never
truly free to express itself in new and exciting ways.11 Others argue that traditional
10.
While technically the entrance at the rear of a building or a house, “back
door” is also a term that refers to a secret means of gaining access to something highly
protected. Beyond its colloquial usage, “back door” is a term that computer programmers
use to refer to hidden software tools that can be used to bypass a computer system’s security
policies in order to gain access to it. See Glossary, IMVAJRA, http://www.imvajra.com/
glossary1.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). This latter usage is a nice metaphor for the kind
of back door regulation that this Article has in mind when it describes the ways in which the
law tries to gain access to the traditional family—something highly protected by the
Constitution—by regulating the non-traditional family.
11.
See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting
Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 1020 (2000) (“[C]ontemporary performance-based
approaches to nonmarital cohabitation posit marriage as the reigning normative model
against which nonsolemnized unions are compared and against which their legal merits are
evaluated.”); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2689
(2008) (“The normative centrality and, indeed, priority of the institution of marriage
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legal relationships, like marriage, are liberating; under this view, traditional
relationships offer considerable freedom vis-à-vis their non-traditional
counterparts because the state so heavily regulates the latter but not the former.12
This Article enhances and challenges both of those accounts. It argues
that traditional kinship not only sits in the shadow of its non-traditional counterpart
but also is less free, and more regulated, than we might think. Its novel descriptive
theory invites commentators and advocates to think more seriously about the
distinctly expressive burdens that non-traditional intimate and family life bear in
our legal order and about how those burdens are unconstitutional. Moreover, and
equally important, its theory asks readers to consider just how far the law reaches
when it regulates as well as just how interconnected the law’s regulation (and
discrimination) makes us.

I. LAW, INTIMATE LIFE, AND FAMILY:
THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE
A. The Conventional Family Law Narrative
Family law projects a certain narrative about the relationship between
traditional and non-traditional kinship. First, and most broadly, family law
assumes that central and marginal kinship structures are largely separate and
disconnected. Central kinship, as its name suggests, is the traditional “nuclear”
family—that is, the married heterosexual couple with biologically related children
who are the product of sexual reproduction. Marginal kinship, by contrast, is the
non-traditional family that fails to conform to the nuclear ideal for any number of
reasons.
Family law often organizes intimate and family life in a way suggesting
that traditional and non-traditional kinship structures inhabit non-overlapping
domains. For instance, my students’ casebook reserves an entirely separate section
for what it terms “non-traditional families,” which, according to the book’s editors,
include individuals engaged in same-sex relationships and non-marital

establishes the standard by which all other forms of kinship, family, friendship, temporary
alliance, and love are both rendered legible and assigned value. In this, and in most
societies, marriage is the measure of all things.”); Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray,
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1256 (2010) (“[S]eeming departures from
the marital family ideal may be less radical than they first appear. Just as unmarried fathers
were recognized as fathers when they acted like husbands, unmarried couples have
sometimes enjoyed legal protection because they acted as though they were married.”).
12.
See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV.
1643, 1665 (1993) [hereinafter Case, Couples and Coupling] (discussing the freedom that
marriage provides vis-à-vis non-traditional alternatives like domestic partnerships, which
require individuals to satisfy a laundry list of criteria that married couples do not have to
satisfy); Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1774 (2005) (same);
Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1199, 1203–05 (2010) [hereinafter Case, What Feminists Have to Lose] (same).
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cohabitation.13 By contrast, the casebook considers the traditional family—the
heterosexual married couple with biological children—under the section entitled
“Marriage and Divorce.”14 This way of thinking about the family is also present in
family law scholarship and case law, each of which tends to conceptualize intimate
and familial life as falling into either a central or a marginal type and to approach
those types in a static and non-dynamic way.15
13.
IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 839–943
(5th ed. 2010).
14.
Id. at 73–202; see also D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON,
MODERN FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 2009) (treating traditional and non-traditional families
separately).
15.
For scholarship that divides intimate and family life along traditional and
non-traditional lines, see, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 319, 380 (2006) (referring to same-sex relationships as “non-traditional”); Susan
Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 41 (2008) (placing
same-sex relationships under the larger category of “nontraditional relationships”); Carlos
A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 515 (2000) (drawing
a distinction between “married couples” and “nontraditional couples”); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (1984)
(drawing a distinction between the traditional nuclear family and “parenting relationships”
that arise “outside the nuclear family”); Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real
Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1147–55 (2003) (referring to gay families as “alternatives” and
making the traditional/non-traditional family distinction but also criticizing that distinction);
Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms,
23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 77–78 (2008) (characterizing children raised by a
single parent or by same-sex parents as examples of “nontraditional parenthood”); Note,
Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal
Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1642–57 (1998) (examining and critiquing
the differential legal treatment of traditional and non-traditional families); Nancy D.
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 472–73
(1990) (referring to lesbian-headed families as non-traditional but also noting the
shortcomings of that categorization because lesbian-headed households are by no means
new). For examples of an alternative perspective, one that critiques the traditional/nontraditional or core–marginal distinction, see KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE:
LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 7 (1997) (“[N]uclear families do not constitute the timeless core
of what it means to have kin in this society, relative to which all other forms of family must
appear as derivative variations or marginal alternatives.”); Marsha Garrison, The
Technological Family: What’s New and What’s Not, 33 FAM. L.Q. 691, 691 (1999) (arguing
that what might look non-traditional is actually quite ordinary); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian
Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 570 (critiquing use of term
“nontraditional” to describe so-called non-traditional families because “the term
‘nontraditional’ is a misnomer. Households that depart from the nuclear model have existed
for all of human history.”). Cases have also employed the traditional/non-traditional
distinction. See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (referring to same-sex marriage as a nontraditional relationship that is deserving of constitutional protection), superseded by
constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended 1999); In re Interest of
Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 203–04, 210 n.14 (Wis. 1991) (referring to a lesbian parent as
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Second, family law assumes that traditional forms of intimate and familial
life dominate their non-traditional counterparts. For instance, some family law
commentators have conceptualized traditional kinship—specifically, heterosexual
marriage—as the “center” that casts its “shadow” over non-traditional alternatives,
including non-marriage (singledom) and domestic partnerships.16 Katherine
Franke, for example, has understood the relationship between formal marriage and
domestic partnerships in center–margin terms, contending that marriage so often
casts its “shadow” over those who are peripheral to it.17 Franke notes that marriage
casts its shadow widely, constituting the legal relationship against which all other
relationships, including domestic partnerships, are defined and determined.18 She
says that “those who fall within marriage’s shadow find themselves locked into a
social field in which the attachments we take up have meaning already determined
by the state.”19 Under this view, a non-traditional structure (domestic partnerships)
is forever sitting in the “shadow” of, and is thus in some sense determined and
dominated by, a traditional structure (marriage).
Third and last, family law assumes that traditional intimate and family life
is rarely regulated whereas its marginal counterpart is always regulated. “While
family law has expanded to embrace non-traditional relationships and family
structures,” one commentator observes, “the courts’ close scrutiny of these
relationships and structures demonstrates their continued preference for the
traditional family unit.”20 Indeed, “the premise of the nuclear family underlies the
legal norm of parental autonomy,”21 and “the traditional respect for privacy
afforded to the family as a unit evaporates when the traditional family form
disappears.”22 As Professor Rao argues, “The very concept of family privacy—the
constitutional doctrine protecting a ‘private realm of family life which the state
may not enter’—presupposes a ‘natural family’ that exists apart from and prior to

being in a non-traditional relationship), overruled by In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). Although this Article refers to kinship in traditional/nontraditional terms, it also understands the interrelationship that exists between them.
16.
See, e.g., Grace Ganz Blumberg, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Conjugal
Relationships: The 2003 California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in
Comparative Civil Rights and Family Law Perspective, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1555, 1557
(2004) (invoking the shadow metaphor); Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage:
Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641,
1656–59, 1709–14 (2003) (same); Franke, supra note 11, at 2693–99 (same).
17.
Franke, supra note 11, at 2693–99.
18.
Id. at 2697–99.
19.
Id. at 2697.
20.
Aubry Holland, Comment, The Modern Family Unit: Toward a More
Inclusive Vision of the Family in Immigration Law, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2008).
21.
Bartlett, supra note 15, at 880.
22.
Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
1495, 1503–04 (1997) (book review); see also David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family
Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 581 (2000) (“Never-married or divorced parents are
subjected to state investigation and direction on a scale that would be considered
unthinkable in the context of married parents in an intact family. . . . It bears remembering
that the first cases recognizing what later came to be known as the constitutional right of
family privacy involved state intrusions upon intact and unified families.”).
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the state.”23 “Implicit in this image,” she continues, “but seldom articulated, is the
fundamental assumption that the natural family consists of two heterosexual
parents and their biological children.”24 According to this view, the law has
adopted a “hands-on” approach to the marginal family that it would never think of
applying to the traditional family, that “freestanding thing, or phenomenon, or
group [that] is distinct from . . . the state.”25
B. Challenging the Conventional Family Law Narrative
Family law’s conventional view of the relationship between traditional
and non-traditional kinship is descriptively imprecise and warrants critique. For
instance, the notion that traditional and non-traditional kinship inhabit separate,
distinct, and largely non-overlapping spheres (think here of the casebook
organization mentioned above) fails to capture the dynamic interrelationship that
exists between them. Similarly, the notion that marginal kinship is forever
dominated by central kinship (think here of the “shadow” metaphor) fails to
account for the extent to which central forms of intimacy and family so often take
shape in the shadow of their marginal counterparts. And finally, the notion that
“the traditional respect for privacy afforded to the family as a unit evaporates when
the traditional family form disappears”26 fails to account for the extent to which
the central family is regulated, albeit indirectly at the margins. Reconceptualizing
the role that marginality plays in the law’s construction of intimate and family life,
as described in the next Parts, offers a more accurate way to think about the family
and its legal regulation, as well as a new way to think about why directly
regulating certain forms of non-traditional kinship might be unconstitutional.

II. RECONCEIVING MARGINALITY
Scholars have long recognized the powerful role that marginal people and
relationships can play in defining a normative vision of social life for everyone.
Those who “have moved outside the margins of a group,” one sociologist writes,
help to give society “its distinctive shape, its unique identity.”27 The “latest
23.
Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the
Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 960 (1996) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
24.
Id. One time that the Supreme Court did articulate as much was in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (upholding state removal procedures
of foster children from their foster homes against a federal due process challenge). There,
the Court observed that “the usual understanding of ‘family’ implies biological
relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have
stressed this element.” Id. at 843. For a more recent expression of this idea, see Long v.
Holtry, 673 F. Supp. 2d 341, 350 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (noting that foster family formations exist
“in contrast to traditional family relationships whose origins are entirely apart from the
power of the State, but are intrinsic to notions of freedom and liberty that are inherent in the
very foundation of our country”).
25.
Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 537, 542.
26.
Baker, supra note 22, at 1503–04.
27.
KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE 11 (1966).
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marginal group,” one historian explains, serves the vital function of defining the
center “by demonstrating what [the center] must never become.”28 In fact,
marginalized people and behavior are “a natural and even beneficial part of social
life” because they “mark the outer limits of group experience and provide a point
of contrast which gives the norm some scope and dimension.”29 Under this view,
we use whatever or whomever lies outside of us in order to define ourselves.30
This Article takes this central insight and alters it slightly. Unlike many
scholarly accounts of marginality, it does not argue that marginal forms of intimate
and family life provide “a point of contrast which gives the norm some scope and
dimension.”31 Rather, it contends that non-traditional relationships and
reproductive practices constitute a vehicle through which the law attempts to
articulate the “norm” for everyone. In this sense, this Article follows in the
footsteps of those family law commentators who have argued that core legal
concepts, like marriage and the family, often come into focus when the law
regulates persons who exist at the periphery of those institutions. As Ariela Dubler
has maintained, the normative meaning of marriage has so frequently taken shape
“in the terrain beyond marriage’s formal borders.”32
This Part’s objective is to offer examples of situations where marginality
helps to bring family law’s central normative structures—ideal marriage, ideal
parenthood, and ideal procreation—into focus. These examples are meant to be
illustrative, not exhaustive. Each demonstrates the subtle interplay between central
and marginal kinship, the expressive burdens that the law so often places on
marginal kinship, and the indirect way in which the law attempts to regulate even
those aspects of intimate and family life that receive robust constitutional
28.
JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 9, 46 (2003).
29.
ERIKSON, supra note 27, at 27.
30.
See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of
Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 287 (1995) (“At least since the time of
G.H. Mead we have understood that even the interior self is hard to imagine in the absence
of ‘others’ out there. In the prevailing individualized, Western, Freud-schooled,
‘masculinist’ world view, those others are the ones from whom the individual self is to be
distinguished.”).
31.
ERIKSON, supra note 27, at 27.
32.
Dubler, supra note 16, at 1649; see also HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE
IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 1 (2000) (observing that it is “through close examination of
struggles at the margins of marital life and marital identities . . . that we come to a historical
understanding of core legal concepts: of wife, of husband, of unity”). This Article
recognizes that core legal concepts like marriage and the family are also brought into focus
and given substance when the law acts in other ways not considered here. My focus here is
on the law’s regulation of marginal kinship in the family law context. But the law also tries
to define core legal concepts through the criminal law, which projects an ideal vision of the
family (as nonviolent, mutually supportive, etc.), and through immigration law, which
projects an ideal vision of marriage (as an institution based on love, financial
interdependence, etc.). See infra notes 62, 69, 147–49 and accompanying text. I focus here
instead on the under-theorized expressive dimension of the law’s direct regulation of
marginal relationships and reproductive practices through mechanisms like exclusionary
marriage regimes and domestic partnership laws.
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protection. In each, regulating at the margins affords the law an opportunity to
express its normative ideals about a variety of institutions that we do not always
think about in statist terms.
A. Same-Sex Marriage and Domestic Partnerships: Creating the Ideal Marriage
1. Same-Sex Marriage
The movement for marriage equality in the United States has given the
law an occasion to articulate familial norms and what Professor Mary Anne Case
has called a “thick” vision of marriage for everyone,33 even—or perhaps
especially—heterosexuals. Interestingly, that movement has produced an image of
marriage as procreative—an oddity, to say the least, in twenty-first-century
America, where most people are thought to marry for love and companionship
rather than for reproduction.34 Dismissed by many as nonsensical,35 the image of
procreative marriage that has emerged from marriage-equality jurisprudence is
best understood when viewed through a normative lens: an attempt to articulate
what marriage should ideally be rather than a description of what it actually is.
In those jurisdictions that have upheld exclusionary marriage laws against
a constitutional challenge, courts have relied heavily on the procreation rationale.
According to that argument, persons of the same sex can be denied the legal ability
to marry each other because they cannot sexually procreate with each other.36
33.
See Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 12, at 1204 (arguing that
a thick view of marriage has emerged from same-sex marriage advocacy).
34.
See, e.g., HARTOG, supra note 32, at 312 (describing the twentieth-century
marriage as one in which spouses can “express creatively our individuality, our shared
identity, and our changing commitments, our love”); Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks,
Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 10 (2009) (describing “the rise of companionate marriage, in which
spouses are expected to satisfy each other’s emotional needs”).
35.
See, e.g., Abrams & Brooks, supra note 34, at 4 (“[N]ever before have courts
so truncated the possible purposes of marriage to assign it one goal: here, the policing of
accidental procreation.”); Kenji Yoshino, Too Good for Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2006, at A19 (describing one court’s early invocation of one version of the procreation
rationale as a “cockeyed aberration” that has gained acceptance by later courts).
36.
The role of procreation in marriage-equality jurisprudence has changed over
the past 40 years. During the first wave of marriage litigation in the 1970s and 1980s, courts
justified exclusionary marriage laws on the basis of propagation of the species. Under this
view, same-sex couples could be denied the right to marry the person of their choice
because a same-sex marriage could not contribute to “the propagation of the human race.”
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see also Adams v. Howerton,
486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (upholding California’s marriage exclusion on
the basis of procreation as propagation of the species); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185,
186–87 (Minn. 1971) (same with respect to Minnesota’s marriage law). Increasingly,
however, courts have turned to a kinder, gentler variation of the procreation justification,
one that ironically casts same-sex couples as superior to their cross-sex counterparts. Under
this modified version, marriage is about encouraging responsible procreation between those
who accidentally procreate and about providing a stable context in which such responsible
procreation can occur. Because same-sex couples always reproduce responsibly—that is,
they ostensibly never have children by accident—it follows that they do not need marriage.
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While years ago “[t]he argument from procreation . . . no longer seem[ed] to be
either advanced seriously by states or taken seriously by courts,”37 many courts
today have embraced it.38 In fact, according to some commentators, procreation is
“probably the most common argument against gay marriage” in certain circles.39
The procreation rationale has been the object of intense criticism, with
some commentators—and, recently, courts—bemoaning its flagrant underinclusiveness, and with others arguing that it bears no relationship whatsoever to
exclusionary marriage legislation because the contemporary civil institution of
marriage has nothing to do with procreation, if it ever did at all.40 Even Justice
Scalia noted in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent that the procreation rationale for
marriage prohibitions is wildly suspect because “the sterile and the elderly” may
marry, though their chance for conception is about zero.41
The conventional explanation for procreation’s success in the same-sex
marriage context runs something like this: True, the law, through the procreation
rationale, burdens same-sex couples in a way that it does not similarly burden
opposite-sex couples. But that is because it can. The Supreme Court has cast the
right to marry, or at least the right to enter into a traditional marriage, as one of
fundamental importance.42 Moreover, it has made more than clear that a right of
“marital privacy” protects couples, once married, from excessive governmental
interference.43 Were the law to require married opposite-sex couples to procreate
See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003) (invoking responsible procreation); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25–
26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (same).
37.
Peter Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of
“Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Governmental Interests for the Purposes of Equal
Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 151 (1998).
38.
See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 619 (Md. 2007) (upholding the
state’s same-sex marriage prohibition partly on the basis of procreation); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (same); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 978
(Wash. 2006) (same).
39.
Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA. COASTAL L.
REV. 181, 193 (2005); see also William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 153, 154 (2004) (“The most common state interest discussed in same-sex
marriage case law relates to procreation . . . .”).
40.
See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389 (D. Mass.
2010) (ruling that section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which defines
marriage for federal purposes as a legally recognized union between one man and one
woman, fails to satisfy rational basis review under the Federal Constitution and observing
that the procreation rationale in support of that legislation “plainly cannot provide a rational
basis upon which to exclude same-sex marriages from federal recognition because . . . the
ability to procreate is not now, nor has it ever been, a precondition to marriage in any state
in the country”); Courtney Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic
Perspective on the Law’s Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393,
400–15 (2007); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1397–98 (2010).
41.
539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
43.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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to either get or stay married, it would surely be violating those rights. As one state
court, responding to the claim that the procreation rationale is irrational because
opposite-sex married couples do not need to procreate, put it: “[I]f the State
excluded opposite-sex couples from marriage based on their intention or ability to
procreate, the State would have to inquire about that subject before issuing a
license, thereby implicating constitutionally rooted privacy concerns.”44
In most states, and under the Federal Constitution, same-sex couples do
not enjoy these constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, non-traditional kinship
structures in general do not receive the constitutional protections that traditional
kinship structures receive.45 It therefore follows that the law may impose an image
of procreative marriage on same-sex couples without “implicating constitutionally
rooted privacy concerns.”46
But there is another way to think about the role that procreation is playing
in the marriage-equality context, one that focuses less on why that rationale either
does or does not make sense on a descriptive level and more on its normative
dimension. Specifically, the legal regulation surrounding marginal kinship—here,
the entire movement for marriage equality—allows the law to articulate what
marriage should ideally be for everyone (namely, procreative), even, or rather
especially, for those whom the law cannot directly regulate without running afoul
of constitutionally guaranteed rights. As New York Times columnist Ross Douthat
recently observed, the image of procreative marriage that has emerged from
marriage-equality jurisprudence only makes sense when viewed normatively. In
his words: “So what are gay marriage’s opponents really defending, if not some
universal, biologically inevitable institution? It’s a particular vision of marriage,
rooted in a particular tradition, that establishes a particular sexual ideal.”47
Similarly, Professor David Cruz has argued that courts’ invocation of procreation
in the marriage-equality context is an instance of “heterosexual reproductive
imperatives” at work in the law—that is, an opportunity for the law to articulate

44.
Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 462
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
45.
See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1974) (finding that
the non-traditional family does not receive the same kind of constitutional protection that
the traditional family receives); John C. v. Martha A., 592 N.Y.S.2d 229, 232 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1992) (stating that while “[a]n individual’s right to privacy in an intimate relationship is
fundamental to human freedom and personal integrity [and] is now firmly rooted in our
law,” those privacy norms are less robust in the context of a “nontraditional familial
relationship”). But see Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (“Just as the ‘decision to marry and raise a
child in a traditional family setting’ is constitutionally protected as a fundamental right, so
too should the decision to choose one’s life partner and have a recognized nontraditional
family be constitutionally protected. . . . The same constitution protects both [kinds of
families].”), superseded by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended
1999).
46.
Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462.
47.
Ross Douthat, The Marriage Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010, at A19.
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“ideals that are normative and thus nonfalsifiable.”48 The procreation rationale, in
short, represents law’s “repronormativity” writ large.49
The procreation rationale thus has a normative aspect that conventional
explanations, criticisms, and discussions of it likely miss. Through it, the law is
able to express its deepest normative commitments about all forms of marriage—
opposite-sex and same-sex alike—and to have a conversation about that institution
that the Constitution would ordinarily prohibit. It turns out, then, that the
procreation rationale is not only about burdening same-sex couples with a
requirement that they could not possibly satisfy. It is also about affording the state
an occasion to shape the social understanding of marriage for everyone. When
viewed in this light, the marriage-equality movement and the role that procreation
has played in it typify law regulating at the margins—that is, law using the
marginal (same-sex relationships) to help create the ideal center (marriage for all).
In this sense, the procreation rationale plays a role similar to that
performed by another rationale often invoked in support of exclusionary marriage
laws: the “children are best served when raised in a household with two biological,
opposite-sex parents” rationale.50 To be sure, myriad households exist in which
children are raised either by one parent (biological or not) or by two non-biological
parents (as in the case of adoptive households). Moreover, the state would surely
violate the Constitution were it to require that parent–child relationships be united
by biological ties.51 For these reasons, the two-biological-parent rationale is best—
and perhaps only—understood when viewed normatively: the law’s attempt to
defend a particular familial ideal and to regulate indirectly that which it cannot
regulate directly.
2. Domestic Partnerships
Unmarried domestic partnerships provide another opportunity for the law
to create the ideal marriage. Take, for instance, local and state domestic partner
statutes, which extend a range of protections to those who statutorily qualify as
48.
David B. Cruz, Heterosexual Reproductive Imperatives, 56 EMORY L.J. 1157,
1166 (2007).
49.
For a critique of the “repronormative forces” at play in law and feminism,
see Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 184 (2001). See also DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 125 (2009) (discussing the
“repronormativity” that surrounds biological justifications for criminal and civil incest laws,
which rest on the assumption that couples likely to engage in incest are both opposite-sex
and procreative).
50.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(citing the United States’ argument in support of the Defense of Marriage Act—that DOMA
“encourage[s] the creation of stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by
both of their biological parents”); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (“The
Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children to
grow up with both a mother and a father.”).
51.
It is worth noting, however, that the state would not violate the Constitution
were it to prohibit households composed of unrelated individuals. See Vill. of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a local zoning ordinance based on familial status).
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domestic partners. The city of Tucson, Arizona, for instance, gives certain rights to
domestic partners, defined as two people who “currently share a primary
residence, are in a relationship of mutual support, and declare that they intend to
remain in such for the indefinite future.”52 Cook County, Illinois, recognizes samesex couples as domestic partners if, among other things, they “share a common
household” and are “in a close and committed relationship of mutual financial and
emotional support.”53 In Lawrence, Kansas, domestic partners are persons who
“share a common permanent residence,” “have agreed to be in a relationship of
mutual interdependence,” and “both contribute to the maintenance and support of
the household.”54 And in Rhode Island, domestic partners are entitled to funeral
rights with respect to their deceased partner as long as they qualify as domestic
partners under the relevant statute, which requires unmarried persons to show,
among other things, that they “resided together and had resided together for at least
one year at the time of death” and “were financially interdependent.”55
Similarly, in 2000, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) set forth a
detailed definition of domestic partner when it recommended that jurisdictions
adopt domestic partnership legislation to protect parties to a relationship from the
strategic behavior of those who will “avoid marriage in order to avoid
responsibilities to a partner.”56 The ALI defines domestic partners as persons “who
for a significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a
couple.”57 It further maintains that “[w]hether persons share a life together as a
couple is determined by reference to all the circumstances,”58 including, for
example:
(b) the extent to which the parties intermingled their finances;
(c) the extent to which their relationship fostered the parties’
economic interdependence, or the economic dependence of one
party upon the other;
(d) the extent to which the parties engaged in conduct and
assumed specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life
together;
(e) the extent to which the relationship wrought change in the
life of either or both parties;

52.
City of Tucson Domestic Partner Registration Instructions, TUCSONAZ.GOV
(Dec. 1, 2003), http://cms3.tucsonaz.gov/dprreg.
53.
Domestic Partnership Affidavit, COOK COUNTY CLERK’S OFF.,
http://www.cookctyclerk.com/vitalrecords/DocumentLibrary/Domestic%20Partnership%20
Affidavit.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
54.
Domestic
Partnership
Registry,
CITY OF LAWRENCE, KAN.,
http://www.lawrenceks.org/city_clerk/domestic_partnership_registry (last visited Dec. 28,
2011).
55.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-33.2-24 (2011).
56.
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02 cmt. b (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
57.
Id. § 6.03(1).
58.
Id. § 6.03(7).
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responsibilities to each other . . . ;

the

parties

59

acknowledged

(g) the extent to which the parties’ relationship was treated by
the parties as qualitatively distinct from the relationship either party
had with any other person; [and]
(h) the emotional or physical intimacy of the parties’
relationship . . . .59

Some commentators argue that domestic partnership statutes such as the
ALI’s force non-traditional relationships to conform to a marital model.60 But that
argument is not quite right because it assumes that a marital model exists for the
law to impose on non-traditional relationships in the first place. A better, or at least
an additional, way to read these statutes is this: Domestic partnership statutes
constitute a way for the law to create a marital model.
More specifically, domestic partnership statutes operate as a vehicle
through which the law expresses its most aspirational commitments about all
relationships, particularly those that it cannot reach directly.61 Unlike domestic
partners, married persons do not need to effect change in each other’s lives. They
do not need to have a unique relationship. And they do not need to be physically
intimate in order to receive the same protections that domestic partners might be
eligible to receive. To be sure, married persons do not even need to be in love.62
59.
Id.
60.
See, e.g., Franke, supra note 11, at 2697 (“The intended effect of the ALI
Principles is to enlarge marriage’s shadow.”).
61.
In this sense, domestic partnership statutes play a role similar to that played
by functional definitions of intimate relationships and family generally. The New York
Court of Appeals’ decision in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989),
has been called the “high water mark” with respect to this functionalist approach. Nan D.
Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 22, 23
(1991). There, the court considered whether two men in an intimate relationship qualified as
a “family” for the purpose of a city’s rent control statute. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54–55. The
court concluded that because the men had sufficiently acted like a family, they qualified as
one under the law. Id. The court in particular noted that the men were financially
interdependent, had a long and exclusive relationship, were emotionally committed to each
other, and relied on each other for “daily family services.” Id. at 55. Together these actions
amounted to a spouse-like relationship. Id. While in one sense Braschi is a radical
opinion—the first to recognize the legal status of same-sex partners as quasi-spouses—it is
also extremely conservative because it projects onto unmarried persons a normative image
of marriage. See, e.g., Ristroph & Murray, supra note 11, at 1256 n.89 (arguing that the
Braschi court “used the normative concept of marriage to inform its understanding of
family”). Most significant for this Article’s purposes, Braschi’s functionalist approach is not
only an opportunity for the law to impose a normative image of marriage onto unmarried
persons, but also an occasion to create that normative image in the first instance. Without a
case like Braschi, the law would have less of an opportunity to reflect on what marriage is
or should be.
62.
Unless, of course, those married persons are a citizen and a noncitizen. See,
e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV.
1625, 1672 (2007) (noting that federal immigration law makes inquiries into whether a
couple “married for love or in a ‘sham, phony, empty ceremony’ intended only to facilitate
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After the couple enters into marriage, and unless and until it divorces, the state
plays a minimal role in directly regulating it.63 As Professor Case has argued,
“‘Married couples in this society are not required to do the rather conservative
things’ courts and regulators typically require of unmarried couples, whether of the
same or of opposite sexes, as a condition for relationship recognition.”64 Were the
law to require married persons to be financially interdependent or even to love
each other, it would certainly be violating a relationship that the Supreme Court
has made clear receives vigorous constitutional protection under the mantle of
marital privacy.65
Marital privacy, however, does not apply to marginal relationships like
domestic partnerships. Nor, importantly, does it prohibit the law from using
marginality as a space in which to reflect on what marriage should ideally be—a
space in which to define marriage, as Professor Case might put it, in “thick”
terms.66 As Sanford Katz has remarked, “In a certain sense the domestic
partnership laws define what some may say is the ideal marriage.”67 Ideally,
married persons would be emotionally and physically intimate. Ideally, married
persons would be economically interdependent. Ideally, married persons would
assume “specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together.”68
And ideally, married persons would be in love.69 What the law cannot do directly
(impose these ideals on married persons) it therefore does indirectly (by imposing
them on domestic partners).

immigration status for one of the spouses”). In this sense, immigration law is another
instance of the law regulating at the margins—projecting its normative commitments (that
all marriages be for love) onto those who can be regulated (noncitizens).
63.
The state, of course, regulates marriage directly at the outset by setting forth
the substantive requirements (gender, age, number) that parties must satisfy in order to enter
into one. It also regulates marriage on the back end if and when the married couple
divorces. In fact, divorce constitutes another instance of the law regulating the substance of
marriage at the margins—in that case, at the margins of the marital relationship itself. See,
e.g., Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75,
76 (2004) (observing that divorce law offers another opportunity for the state “to help shape
the social understanding of marriage, and thus the actions of those who partake in it”); see
also Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by
Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1545–46 (1998); Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the
Rules of Marital Property Be Normative?, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265; Meyer, supra note
22, at 580–81; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce,
76 VA. L. REV. 9, 27 (1990).
64.
Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 12, at 1203 (quoting Case,
Couples and Coupling, supra note 12, at 1665).
65.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
66.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
67.
Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251,
1269 (1998).
68.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, § 6.03(7)(d).
69.
See Abrams, supra note 62, at 1672 (noting that federal immigration law
requires marriages between citizens and noncitizens to be based on love).
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B. De Facto Parenthood: Creating the Ideal Parent
If the marriage-equality movement and domestic partnership legislation
typify law creating the ideal marriage, then the de facto parent doctrine typifies
law creating the ideal parent. Under that doctrine, non-legal parents who act
enough like a parent can obtain parental rights, including custody and visitation.70
Courts invoking the doctrine have relied on a variety of factors to determine
whether a non-parent figure qualifies as a de facto parent, including whether the
non-parent “assumed the obligations of parenthood by taking significant
responsibility for the child’s care, education and development” and whether the
non-parent “has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.”71
Similarly, the ALI has recommended that the definition of “parent” be
expanded to include a de facto parent, who, in its view, is someone who has
“regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the
person with whom the child primarily lived.”72 The ALI defines “caretaking
functions” to include the following:
(a) satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing the
child’s bedtime and wake-up routines, caring for the child when sick
or injured, being attentive to the child’s personal hygiene needs
including washing, grooming, and dressing, playing with the child
and arranging for recreation, protecting the child’s physical safety,
and providing transportation;
(b) directing the child’s various developmental needs,
including the acquisition of motor and language skills, toilet
training, self-confidence, and maturation;
(c) providing discipline, giving instruction in manners,
assigning and supervising chores, and performing other tasks that
attend to the child’s needs for behavioral control and self-restraint;
(d) arranging for the child’s education, including remedial or
special services appropriate to the child’s needs and interests,
communicating with teachers and counselors, and supervising
homework;
(e) helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate
interpersonal relationships with peers, siblings, and other family
members;
(f) arranging for health-care providers, medical follow-up,
and home health care;
70.
Lindsy J. Rohlf, Note, The Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent
Doctrines: How Should the Uniform Parentage Act Define “Parent”?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 691
(2009).
71.
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000) (quoting In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995)) (finding that the same-sex partner of a
biological mother qualified as a parent entitled to custody and/or visitation rights under the
de facto parent doctrine).
72.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(B).
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(g) providing moral and ethical guidance;
(h) arranging alternative care by a family member, babysitter,
or other child-care provider or facility, including investigation of
alternatives, communication with providers, and supervision of
care.73

De facto parenthood and the doctrine that established it provide the law
with an opportunity to create the ideal parent.74 Supreme Court landmarks like
Meyer v. Nebraska,75 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,76 and Wisconsin v. Yoder77
protect parental autonomy in the domain of child rearing. As such, they effectively
prohibit the state from requiring that all parents “manag[e] the child’s bedtime and
wake-up routines,” “giv[e] instruction in manners,” and “provid[e] moral and
ethical guidance.”78 (Imagine what would happen if a state were to legally require
parents to instill “manners” in their children.) Those cases, we might say, define
parenthood in thin terms.
Those cases do not, however, extend constitutional protection to marginal
or non-traditional parent–child relationships like de facto parenthood. Nor do they
prohibit the law from using de facto parenthood as a frame in which to construct
and communicate a “thick” vision of parent–child relations for everyone. Ideally,
all parents would help their children “to develop and maintain appropriate
interpersonal relationships.”79 Ideally, all parents would be attentive to their
children’s “hygiene.”80 And ideally, all parents would provide “moral and ethical
73.
Id. § 2.03(5).
74.
In addition, de facto parent definitions like the ALI’s provide the law with an
opportunity to articulate the ideal distribution of labor between parents (assuming that there
are two parents to distribute labor between). For instance, the ALI suggests that a nonparent, in order to be considered a de facto parent, must have either “regularly performed a
majority of the caretaking functions for the child” or “regularly performed a share of
caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily
lived.” Id. § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(A)–(B). On this view, the parent who performs less than 50% of
his or her share of caretaking functions is, in the eyes of the law, somehow less of a parent
than the parent who does at least 50%. If this is the case, then recent empirical research
indicating that most two-parent households do not split child-care labor in a proportion even
remotely approximating 50–50 is, to say the least, revealing. For an article summarizing
these studies, see Lisa Belkin, When Mom and Dad Share It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008,
§ MM (Magazine), at 44.
75.
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state law that prohibited foreign
language education violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it unduly interfered with parental autonomy).
76.
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a state law that required public school
attendance violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it unduly
interfered with parental autonomy).
77.
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding that a state compulsory school law that
required students to attend school past the eighth grade violated, in part, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it unduly interfered with Amish parents’
parental autonomy).
78.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, § 2.03(5)(a), (c), (g).
79.
Id. § 2.03(5)(e).
80.
Id. § 2.03(5)(a).
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guidance” for their children.81 Prohibited by the Constitution from imposing those
ideals on all parents directly, the law indirectly nudges parents toward satisfying
them by regulating parenthood at the margins.
C. Alternative Reproduction: Perfecting Procreation
Commentators have already observed the extent to which alternative
procreation82 reproduces the traditional family through the private preferences of
those who have availed themselves of it. Professor Dorothy Roberts, for instance,
argues that alternative reproduction, while a cutting edge technology that in one
sense challenges the traditional family model,83 more often than not profoundly
reinforces it. She points to the fact that couples using sperm banks to procreate
regularly choose donors on the basis of race in an effort to reproduce the racial
make-up of their own family—which is usually white, given that these
technologies “are used almost exclusively by affluent white people.”84
Less critically appraised, however, is the extent to which the law, rather
than private actors, has used alternative procreation as an occasion to establish the
ideal family as well as the conditions under which procreation should ideally
occur. Take, for instance, a 2007 bill that Donald Carcieri, then Governor of
Rhode Island, vetoed. The bill required that fertility-related insurance coverage be
extended to unmarried persons, who are currently excluded from such coverage
because they do not satisfy the condition of marriage.85 In his veto message,
Carcieri commented that he vetoed the bill because “[a]s a matter of public policy,
the state should be encouraging the birth of children to two-parent families, not the
reverse.”86 Similarly, lawmakers in some states have sponsored legislation that
would categorically prohibit fertility providers from “offering and performing any
medical procedure on an unmarried woman for the purpose of conception or

81.
Id. § 2.03(5)(g).
82.
Alternative procreation is defined here as the panoply of ways that persons
conceive and bear children through assisted means, including artificial insemination, sperm
donation, and in vitro fertilization. See Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra
note 3, at 911 (listing the various assisted reproductive technologies (“ARTs”)).
83.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935,
935 (1996); see also Rao, supra note 23, at 952 (referring to the potential for ARTs “to
undermine the traditional [familial] paradigm”); id. at 958–59 (“At the most obvious level,
assisted reproductive technologies enable the formation of families by gay men, lesbians,
single people, and post-menopausal women, visibly assaulting the traditional image of the
two-parent, heterosexual, biologically-connected family.” (emphasis added)).
84.
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 244 (1995); see
also Roberts, supra note 83, at 936 (stating that ARTs “rarely serve to subvert conventional
family norms” and that “[m]ost often they complete a traditional nuclear family by
providing a married couple with a child”).
85.
See R.I. Governor Blocks Infertility Bill, USA TODAY, July 19, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-07-19-fertility-treatment_N htm.
86.
Id.; see also Lisa Vernon-Sparks, Expanded Infertility Coverage Vetoed,
PROVIDENCE J., Jul. 20, 2007, at B1 (recounting the remarks of a spokesperson for the
Governor that “[t]he Governor believes that the two-parent family provides a more stable
environment”).
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procreation.”87 While such bills were ultimately dropped, their “mere introduction
caused alarm among those who favor equal access to [assisted reproductive
technology] regardless of marital status.”88
In addition, as mentioned in this Article’s Introduction, alternative
procreation has provided the law with an opportunity to articulate a vision of
procreation as race neutral and incest preventative. For example, some
commentators have argued that the law should limit the number of children born
from any one individual’s donated sperm in order to prevent “accidental incest.”89
“In an age of easy travel, donor secrecy, and limited understanding of genetics,”
they contend, “reducing the number of children that can be born from each donor
reduces the possibility of inadvertent consanguinity.”90 Other commentators have
urged the law to take more seriously sperm banks’ practice of organizing donors
according to their racial background. While recognizing that sperm banks and the
commercial transactions that they facilitate are private and therefore not reachable
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, these commentators argue that
“racially salient forms of donor disclosure are pernicious social practices, which,
while operating beyond the reach of the law, ought to be condemned as bad
policy.”91
Imagine the fate of the law that placed these demands—or ideals—on
sexual procreation and on the sexual relationships that might lead to it. For
instance, the constitutional right to procreate arguably prohibits the law from
requiring that persons be married in order to have children.92 Similarly, the
procreative right, along with the right to sexual autonomy recognized in Lawrence
v. Texas,93 arguably prohibits the law from punishing men who have sex and
87.
Daar, supra note 15, at 20.
88.
Id.
89.
Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—Or the Curtain?—For
Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59 (2009); see also Jacqueline Mroz,
From One Sperm Donor, 150 Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, at D1 (discussing the
accidental incest fear in the context of the unregulated sperm donation industry).
90.
Cahn, supra note 89, at 102.
91.
Fox, supra note 5, at 1844, 1846–47; see also Dov Fox, Choosing Your
Child’s Race, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2011) [hereinafter Fox, Choosing Your Child’s
Race].
92.
See, e.g., Robertson, Embryos, supra note 3, at 962–63 (“Given the personal
significance of reproduction, it would seem to deserve protection for unmarried as well as
married persons. . . . [B]anning coital or noncoital conception by single persons seems
absurd when unmarried sexual relations are common and when single women cannot be
forced to use contraception or to abort after pregnancy has occurred.”). It likely does not,
however, prohibit states like Rhode Island from requiring that individuals be married in
order to be insured for reproductive assistance. A state insurance law that requires persons
to be married in order to receive insurance benefits for third-party reproductive assistance
(as in Rhode Island) does not run afoul of constitutional privacy guarantees any more than
does a federal law that bans the use of Medicaid funds for most abortions. See Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). As in the abortion context, so too in the third-party reproductive
assistance context would the Court—were it to hear a constitutional challenge to a law like
Rhode Island’s—almost certainly draw a distinction between negative and positive rights
and find that Skinner only protects the former, not the latter.
93.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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procreate with several women—even if that procreation might lead to accidental
incest because of the possibility of multiple siblings who do not know each other.94
Finally, the rights to sexual and procreative autonomy arguably prohibit the law
from requiring that individuals sexually reproduce in race-neutral ways. In sum, it
would be fair to say that the constitutional rights to sexual and procreative
autonomy collectively advance a rather thin normative vision of procreation, one
that does not burden those who procreate in traditional (i.e., sexual) ways with the
reproductive preferences that saturate most discussions about alternative
procreation.
The same constitutional rights that protect traditional sexual procreation,
however, do not necessarily apply to non-sexual procreation. As one commentator
argues, “Autonomy interests are implicated differently in assisted reproduction
than they are in sexual reproduction or romantic dating.”95 “What is present in the
romantic matching context that is missing in the reproductive matching context,”
he contends, “is meaningful interface between the parties on either side of the
exchange.”96 Nor, importantly, do those constitutional rights prohibit
commentators and policymakers from using legal issues surrounding non-sexual
procreation as an occasion to signal what they would like all procreation to look
like—marital, controlled, race blind, or all of those things. As with marriage and
parenthood, procreation emerges from the legal regulation of its non-traditional
form as something that is considerably thicker than the Constitution would
normally permit.

III. REGULATING AT THE MARGINS
Part II’s survey of family law matters involving the regulation of
marginal kinship complicates family law’s conventional logic. First, given the
extent to which the law uses non-traditional kinship as an occasion to bring a
normative vision of traditional kinship into focus, we can hardly say that
traditional and non-traditional kinship structures are separate and distinct. To treat
them as though they were, as some family law commentators do,97 is to obscure
the dynamic relationship that actually exists between them.

94.
In the context of sexual sperm donation, the situation in which accidental
incest would most likely occur would be if a man were having sex with many women,
which would inevitably involve extramarital sexual relations given that
polygamy/polyamory is illegal in every state. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 49, at 71. If
the man were married, then those extramarital sexual relations would constitute adultery,
which continues to be criminal in some states even after Lawrence. See id. Even if the man
is not married, his extramarital sexual activity might constitute criminal fornication in those
states that continue to criminalize extramarital sex. However, criminal fornication statutes,
as the Virginia Supreme Court recently recognized in Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371
(Va. 2005), are unconstitutional after Lawrence because they criminalize the only kind of
sex—that of the extramarital variety—in which gays and lesbians from those states that do
not recognize same-sex marriage can legally engage.
95.
Fox, supra note 5, at 1882.
96.
Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, supra note 91, at 11.
97.
See supra Part I.A.
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Second, the shadow metaphor that commentators have invoked to
describe the relationship between traditional and non-traditional kinship98 could
easily work the other way. To be sure, it is certainly true that “[h]istorically,
marriage has functioned as a gnomon, the central pillar of a sundial, casting
shadows outward” and determining the relationships of even unmarried persons.99
And it is certainly true that the legitimacy of non-traditional relationships is often
measured by the extent to which they approximate the nuclear marital model.100 In
this sense, non-traditional intimacy is indeed determined and overshadowed by
traditional types.
It is also true, however, that family law’s central institutions, including
marriage, are brought into focus most clearly when the law regulates the marginal
space outside of them. Without the non-traditional couple, the law would never
have the opportunity to reflect on what marriage is (or should be) in the first place,
protected as that institution is by the robust privacy norms that prohibit the state
from talking about it in a very substantive way. When viewed in this light, the
margins define and determine the center no less than the center defines and
determines them.
Finally, it is simply not true, as the conventional family law narrative
insists, that the law has “little to say” about what traditional kinship ought to look
like,101 or that “[t]he living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the
household, and not for the courts to determine.”102 The law, as the above examples
show, has quite a lot to say about what traditional kinship ought to look like on a
substantive level—about what traditional marriage, parenthood, and procreation
should ideally be. It simply expresses those normative commitments indirectly
rather than directly by regulating non-traditional intimate and family life. Put
differently, the constitutional guarantees that prohibit the law from directly
regulating “[t]he living standards of a family”103 do nothing to constrain it from
98.
See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
99.
Dubler, supra note 16, at 1645.
100.
See, e.g., Ristroph & Murray, supra note 11, at 1256 (“[S]eeming departures
from the marital family ideal may be less radical than they first appear.”).
101.
Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1993 (2010); see also Martha M.
Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 79, 104 (2001) (“One of the reasons that business relationships and intimate
relationships are described as private is the purported lack of state intervention in those
relationships. . . . During the course of the relationship, the state generally allows the parties
to regulate their own affairs.”); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 40, at 1402 (“[T]here is no
direct state action involved in how one raises one’s children, engages in sexual intimacy,
uses contraceptives, terminates a pregnancy, or chooses with whom to live.”).
102.
McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (rejecting a wife’s
suit for maintenance, notwithstanding the husband’s common-law duty of support, on the
ground that “to maintain [such an action], the parties must be separated or living apart from
each other,” because otherwise the court would be unduly interfering with the marital
relationship). McGuire is the common-law duty-of-support case that is used in “most family
law casebooks . . . to introduce the concept of marital privacy” and one that maintains a
“paradigmatic stature in American family law.” HARTOG, supra note 32, at 9.
103.
McGuire, 59 N.W.2d at 342.
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trying to regulate that same family through the back door. The legal regulation of
non-traditional kinship represents just such an instance of back door regulation.
On this last point, how can we properly say that the law is trying to
“regulate” even those forms of intimate and family life that it cannot directly reach
when it regulates those who exist at the margins? Surely a married heterosexual
couple does not feel forced to procreate within marriage simply because a court
upholds the constitutionality of an exclusionary marriage law on the basis of
procreation. Surely a legal parent does not feel forced to instill a sense of ethics in
her daughter—or even love her daughter—simply because the law is more likely to
reward parental rights to those individuals who do those things under the de facto
parent doctrine. And surely the white man from the hypothetical that opened this
Article does not feel forced to procreate in race-neutral ways just because the law,
given its strong commitment to race neutrality, strongly discourages sperm banks’
practice of organizing donors on the basis of race. If the regulation of nontraditional kinship does not directly impose a set of normative commitments on
those in traditional relationships, then how is it that traditional kinship is being
“regulated” when the law regulates marginality? Couldn’t it simply be that when
the law regulates marginality, that is all that it is doing—regulating marginality,
rather than trying to regulate all of us?
The “regulation” that this Article contemplates is of an indirect, rather
than a direct, sort. It is the kind of regulation that commentators envision when
they talk about the law’s expressive and channeling functions, discussed below.
A. Marginality and Law’s Expressive Function
Cass Sunstein defines the law’s expressive function as “the function of
law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly.”104 Much
of the time, he writes, the law attempts to alter social norms “unaccompanied by
much in the way of enforcement activity.”105 For instance, laws that require
individuals to curb their dogs “are rarely enforced through the criminal law.”106
Nevertheless, such laws “have an important effect in signalling appropriate
behavior and in inculcating the expectation of social opprobrium and, hence,
shame in those who deviate from the announced norm.”107 Regardless of whether
curbing laws are enforced, they “can help reconstruct norms and the social
meaning of action.”108
Curbing ordinances represent just one example among many of laws that
incentivize behavioral shifts in oblique rather than direct ways. Whereas
sometimes “[n]orm entrepreneurs in the private sector” can help to shape social
104.
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2024 (1996). For law’s expressive function, see also Elizabeth S. Anderson &
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1503 (2000) and Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1 (2000).
105.
Sunstein, supra note 104, at 2032 (emphasis omitted).
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
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meaning and change collective behavior, often it is the law itself that performs the
function of “express[ing] a judgment about [an] underlying activity in such a way
as to alter social norms.”109 “Without understanding the expressive function of
law,” Sunstein insists, “we will have a hard time getting an adequate handle on
public views on such issues as civil rights, prostitution, the environment,
endangered species, capital punishment, and abortion.”110
Law is expressive when it uses marginality to make normative statements
and “judgments” about what all forms of intimacy and family life ought to look
like. While domestic partner legislation and the de facto parent doctrine surely do
not control married couples and traditional parents directly, they both allow the
law to express and to signal appropriate behavior in ways that might over time
alter spousal and parental norms. In this sense, marginality (and its legal
regulation) exemplifies law’s expressive function, giving it the opportunity to
construct meaning and to shape human behavior obliquely rather than relying on
enforcement activity to achieve that same goal directly.111
B. Marginality and Law’s Channeling Function
Carl Schneider writes that “in the channelling function the law creates or
(more often) supports social institutions which are thought to serve desirable
ends.”112 An underappreciated function of family law, the channeling function in
the domain of intimate and family life seeks not only to steer individuals into what
the law regards to be socially desirable institutions—the most notable among them
being marriage and parenthood—but also to encourage individuals to act in
normatively desirable ways once they are in those institutions. To be sure, as with
law’s expressive function, family law’s channeling function “does not primarily
use direct legal coercion.”113 As much as the law would like to encourage
individuals to marry, have children, and love their children, “[p]eople are not
forced to marry. One can contract out (formally or informally) of many of the rules
underlying marriage. One need not have children, and one is not forced to treat
them lovingly.”114
That said, family law is still able to perform a channeling function
indirectly; in fact, it is primarily through indirect regulation, Schneider argues, that
109.
Id. at 2034.
110.
Id. at 2028–29.
111.
Criminal laws (unlike Sunstein’s curbing ordinances) that are enforced, of
course, regulate both directly and obliquely. For instance, in their thoughtful and
comprehensive examination of the criminal justice system’s family related benefits and
burdens, Dan Markel and his co-authors observe that many family-ties burdens “promote a
certain vision of family life within society” in addition to punishing behavior after it occurs.
MARKEL ET AL., supra note 49, at 78. “[F]rom the ex ante position,” they argue,
“criminalizing failures to rescue [or] failures to supervise, . . . and banning incest, adultery,
or bigamy are all aimed at keeping certain kinds of families together to perform the work
associated with a certain kind of idealized family life.” Id.
112.
Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 498 (1992).
113.
Id. at 504.
114.
Id.
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the law’s channeling function works.115 For instance, while family law cannot
directly force parents to be emotionally invested in their children, it can encourage
emotional investments indirectly through the law of custody, which rewards such
investments by looking favorably on them in the best-interest-of-the-child
calculus.116 In this way, then, “[c]ustody law obliquely sets standards for parental
behavior and emphasizes the centrality of children’s interests.”117 Family law’s
channeling function, in other words, indirectly sets standards for ideal parental
behavior through the law of custody, just as it “indirectly sets some standards for
marital behavior through the law of divorce.”118
The legal regulation of marginality serves a channeling function
analogous to the one that Schneider describes. As shown in Part II, the regulation
of marginal kinship gives the law an occasion to do what the Constitution would
ordinarily prohibit it from doing—namely, articulate normative marriage,
parenthood, and procreation. One need only think here of the profoundly
normative spouse that emerges from the ALI’s definition of domestic partner, or of
the profoundly normative parent that emerges from the Institute’s definition of de
facto parent.119 As such, the legal regulation of marginality performs the
channeling function of supporting, if only indirectly, “social institutions which are
thought to serve desirable ends.”120
Moreover, the legal regulation of marginality represents just the kind of
“indirect” regulation, or indirect incentivizing, of which Schneider speaks when he
states that “the channelling function does not primarily use direct legal coercion”
in its attempt “to create—or, more often, to recruit—social institutions and to mold
and sustain them.”121 For example, Part II suggested that the law has used the legal
quest for marriage equality by same-sex couples as an opportunity to put forth a
normative view of marriage as procreative. While the law of course cannot force
married persons to procreate in order to stay married, it can try to incentivize them
to do just that by projecting a vision of marriage that is inherently procreative—
and by consistently endorsing that vision in a public way.

115.
See id. at 513 (“Channelling primarily works . . . obliquely and interstitially.
That is, it does not set all the terms of behavior within an institution, but rather creates a
system of incentives and disincentives that touch participants only in places, not
globally. . . . In short, because channelling often uses only indirect and moderate
force, . . . its power and utility are limited.”).
116.
See id. at 503.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 502; see also Baker, supra note 63, at 1548–49 (“As it has emerged to
date, the law affords negative parental rights to married parents because the primary parent–
child relationship is so important to both parent and child, but the law ignores the
importance of that primary relationship once parents are divorced or if they were never
married.”).
119.
See supra notes 56–59, 72–73, 78–81 and accompanying text.
120.
Schneider, supra note 112, at 498.
121.
Id. at 503–04.
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C. Marginality and Back Door Regulation
When the law regulates non-traditional kinship, it expresses norms for all
of us and attempts to channel us into satisfying them. As such, it would be fair to
say that the legal regulation of marginality serves both an expressive and a
channeling function. Together, those functions invite us to consider the law’s
regulation of non-traditional kinship as a form of indirect—or back door—
regulation of everyone, even those whose intimate and familial decisions are
accorded significant constitutional protection. To be sure, privacy guarantees
might prohibit the law from imposing a normative conception of the family from
above. Those guarantees do not, however, prohibit the law from expressing its
normative commitments about intimate and domestic life, from “establishing”
ideal models of intimate and family life,122 and, quite possibly, from channeling
individuals into relationships that approximate those models.
Admittedly, one might argue that when the law’s normative vision of the
institutions here discussed—marriage, parenthood, and procreation—does not
coincide with the descriptive reality of how most people in those institutions
behave, then the law fails miserably at indirect or back door regulation. Take, for
instance, the procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage laws. This Article has
taken the position that the procreation rationale represents a way for the law to
shape the meaning of marriage (as procreative) for all of us and to thereby channel
us into marital relationships that conform to that meaning. However, the
procreation rationale could arguably have the opposite effect. Indeed, the image of
procreative marriage that has emerged from marriage-equality jurisprudence could
have the effect of undermining our respect for the law itself. The more that the law
insists on a normative definition of marriage that is so at odds with the descriptive
reality of those in that institution, the less influential the law might in fact be in
regulating married persons.123
At the same time, though, and as commentators have recognized, courts
might actually have considerable “power over the public’s perception of
marriage.”124
No trained lawyer would think that just because some courts say
that particular states might have created marriage law in order to
encourage otherwise irresponsible heterosexuals to procreate
responsibly that this was really what these states believed. But does
the public know this? And even if lawyers and judges “know” what
rational basis review is, don’t they also learn what abstract and
evanescent concepts like “marriage” mean through the reification
that occurs when courts make attempts to textually define the
undefinable?125

122.
For the argument that familial liberty requires familial disestablishment no
less than free religious exercise requires religious disestablishment under the First
Amendment, see Ristroph & Murray, supra note 11, at 1240.
123.
See, e.g., Abrams & Brooks, supra note 34, at 33–35.
124.
Id. at 33.
125.
Id. at 33–34.
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To be sure, corporations and the media know quite well that the
communication or signaling of certain ideals—however ridiculous they might
seem at first glance—can, over time, change the way that we think about
something. For instance, a McDonald’s near where I live in Rhode Island recently
replaced its traditional golden arches for green arches. The company’s move is
both a descriptive and an aspirational one—a “sign” that it is going green in terms
of company practices126 as well as an invitation to the public to think about
McDonald’s in green terms. However absurd that might be—for some the notion
of a green McDonald’s is oxymoronic at best and downright fraudulent at worst—
seeing the green arches every day on my way to work might, over time, change the
way that I think about the “king” of fast food. The green arches might even
encourage me to eat there.
So too with procreation and the other normative commitments that are
expressed when the law regulates marginality. However absurd the law’s
procreative ideals might be for many opposite-sex couples, the frequent
communication of those ideals might eventually change the way that we think
about what marriage is or should be. Significantly, advocates bringing
constitutional claims on behalf of same-sex couples have, over time, conformed to
the law’s procreative image of marriage. Rather than simply challenge the claim
that marriage is inherently procreative, litigants now increasingly argue that samesex couples are procreative (albeit in a different way), and that they, no less than
opposite-sex couples, can satisfy a procreative definition of marriage.127 It is no
coincidence that many of the named plaintiffs in marriage-equality litigation have
children themselves, and that children have played an increasingly salient role in
that litigation.128 If the procreation rationale has changed the way that marriageequality advocacy envisions marriage, then who is to say that it could not change
the way that we all think about that institution?

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Having thus far been primarily descriptive in scope, this Article now turns
to more practical considerations. It uses the theory described above—that the law
126.
See McDonald’s Going Green, CNBC.COM (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:40 AM),
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1254427329.
127.
See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 53, Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (No. CV04-4001813) (arguing that the procreation rationale for marriage prohibitions is overinclusive because some same-sex couples are procreative).
128.
See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 761 n.23 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (Kline, J., concurring and dissenting) (summarizing the testimony of a
plaintiff’s daughter in marriage-equality litigation), rev’d, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, amendment ruled
unconstitutional by Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2012); Respondents’ Opening Brief on the Merits at 15, In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999) (providing a marriage-equality plaintiff’s testimony
regarding the harm that her son suffered as a consequence of a state law prohibiting her
from marrying); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics,
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) (discussing “the deployment of children” in
marriage-equality litigation).
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expresses its normative ideals for everyone by regulating those who exist at the
margins of intimate and familial life—to advance a new constitutional argument:
The law burdens non-traditional kinship on an expressive level by using it as a
vehicle to regulate all of us, and those expressive burdens sometimes violate the
Constitution’s guarantee of equality. To be clear, other commentators have
elucidated the deeply expressive dimensions of intimate relationships and have
identified the constitutional infirmities of regulating non-traditional intimacy in a
way that impermissibly burdens expressive interests. Most notable in this regard is
Professor Kenneth Karst, who famously argued that legal regimes that burden nontraditional intimacy violate a “freedom of intimate association” that the
Constitution staunchly protects.129 Drawing from, but expanding on, Professor
Karst’s insights, this Article contends that the law’s regulation of marginal kinship
raises serious constitutional concerns not just because that regulation burdens
marginal actors’ right to express themselves through their relationships, as
Professor Karst has so eloquently argued and so cogently demonstrated. In
addition, the law’s regulation of marginal kinship raises serious constitutional
concerns because sometimes it represents the law using marginal kinship, and only
marginal kinship, in a purely expressive way to communicate the law’s normative
ideals—ideals that traditional kinship never has to satisfy and that non-traditional
kinship often cannot satisfy. Under this view, the Constitution is violated when the
law effectively uses marginal kinship for no other reason than to be expressive—
that is, for no other reason than to express or communicate the law’s deep
normative commitments.
Take, for instance, exclusionary marriage laws, which advocates and
commentators have alternatively argued violate constitutional guarantees of due
process, equal protection (as a form of sex and sexual orientation discrimination),
and free expression.130 Only two courts have found that marriage restrictions
violate the fundamental right to marry under a state constitution (California) and
under the Federal Constitution.131 With some notable exceptions, most courts have
dismissed both the sex and the sexual orientation discrimination arguments, either
finding that marriage laws do not discriminate on the basis of sex132 or that they
129.
See Karst, supra note 1, at 626–30 (defining the emergence of a “freedom of
intimate association” in constitutional jurisprudence).
130.
See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians
and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Clifford J. Rosky, Perry
v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 913 (2011);
Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49
UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001).
131.
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(finding that California’s constitutional marriage prohibition violates the due process and
equality guarantees of the Federal Constitution), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 1016696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
at 452 (holding the prohibition unconstitutional under the California Constitution).
132.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting the
sex discrimination argument); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 & n.13 (Vt. 1999) (same).
Other courts that have struck down exclusionary marriage laws on state constitutional
grounds have declined to consider the sex discrimination claim. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). To date, only one court has held that marriage laws constitute
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permissibly discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,133 a non-suspect
classification entitled to minimal judicial scrutiny.134 And no high court in any
state has seriously considered the First Amendment claim—that is, the argument
that marriage restrictions violate the constitutional right to free expression.135
Moreover, commentators have variously objected to some of these arguments on
normative grounds. Most recently, Professor Case has criticized the marriageequality movement for abandoning the sex discrimination argument in favor of the
sexual orientation discrimination claim and the thick understanding of sexual
orientation identity on which that claim rests.136
Advocates and commentators have overlooked an additional argument for
why exclusionary marriage laws are unconstitutional, one that might be more
palatable to those who object on normative grounds to some of the standard
constitutional arguments against those laws. According to this argument,
exclusionary marriage laws violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection
because they burden same-sex couples, but not opposite-sex married persons, on
an expressive level by subjecting same-sex couples, and only same-sex couples, to
the law’s procreative ideal. For instance, as discussed in Parts II and III, the
procreation rationale and the two-biological-parents rationale are best, and perhaps
only, understood in normative terms: expressive projections of what the law would
like for all married persons to be doing (procreating and raising biological
children), even if many of those couples are not. In Parts II and III, I suggested that
those expressive projections are an instance of back door regulation: What the
Constitution prohibits the law from doing directly (imposing procreative demands
on heterosexual married persons), the law attempts to achieve indirectly (by
effectively imposing those same impossible demands on unmarried same-sex
couples).
When the law uses non-traditional kinship (here, same-sex relationships)
as a vehicle through which to express and establish ideal projections or models of
a presumptively unconstitutional form of sex discrimination. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 23 (amended 1998). In Perry, a federal district court held that a state marriage
prohibition was an impermissible form of sexual orientation discrimination under the
Federal Constitution, although it recognized the deep interconnectedness between sex and
sexual orientation discrimination. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996 (“[S]ex and sexual
orientation are necessarily interrelated, as an individual’s choice of romantic or intimate
partner based on sex is a large part of what defines an individual’s sexual orientation.”). A
divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 1116577, 2012 WL 372713, at *26–29 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012).
133.
See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10–12. But see Perry, 2012 WL 372713,
at *28 (finding that Proposition 8 violates the Federal Constitution’s Equal Protection
Clause because it impermissibly discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation); Varnum,
763 N.W.2d at 862 (finding that Iowa’s marriage exclusion constituted an impermissible
form of sexual orientation discrimination under the Iowa Constitution).
134.
See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10–12.
135.
For the First Amendment argument, see David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It
Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 925 (2001).
136.
See Case, What Feminists Have to Lose, supra note 12, at 1204–05.
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intimate and family life for everyone, it directly subjects non-traditional kinship,
but not traditional kinship, to distinctly expressive burdens.137 Viewed in this light,
exclusionary marriage laws violate equal protection because they withhold the
tangible and intangible benefits of marriage from same-sex couples—benefits that
opposite-sex couples are eligible to enjoy. In addition, exclusionary marriage laws
violate equal protection because they use non-traditional—but not traditional—
kinship in a purely expressive or normative way. As such, they treat nontraditional relationships differently, and ultimately less favorably, than traditional
relationships.
Other commentators have argued that sometimes “the constitutional
wrong inheres in what the law expresses.”138 “[I]t is the expressive character of
state action,” they maintain, “that determines whether a law or policy violates
Equal Protection.”139 For instance, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court found that racial segregation was unconstitutional not necessarily because it
caused concrete harm—to be sure, the Brown Court itself declared that “[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal;”140 rather, the Court found that racial
segregation was unconstitutional because of what that segregation expressed—
namely, “a message of unequal worth.”141
This Article similarly argues that an equality violation might sometimes
inhere in the expressive dimension of legal regulation. Admittedly, unlike the
message expressed by segregation, the message expressed by the legal regulation
of any form of non-traditional kinship considered above is not itself morally
objectionable. Procreation (in the marriage-equality context) and incest prevention
(in the alternative procreation context) are not inherently bad—in fact, many
would say quite the opposite. Nevertheless, those in non-traditional intimate and
family structures are treated with unequal “concern” by the law when it imposes
expressive burdens on them and on them alone.142 In this sense, we might say that
the constitutional wrong inheres not in what the law expresses but rather in how
the law expresses—namely, in an uneven way.
Importantly, this Article does not posit that the law always violates
equality guarantees when it treats traditional and non-traditional kinship differently
on an expressive level. Consider, for instance, the de facto parent doctrine. Earlier,
this Article suggested that the doctrine presents the law with an opportunity to
craft a normative parental model—one that the law could not impose on most
137.
Importantly, this Article recognizes that traditional kinship is being regulated
on an expressive level when the law regulates non-traditional kinship; indeed, that is one of
its main descriptive points. The salient difference, however, between those forms of
regulation is this: Whereas non-traditional kinship bears expressive burdens directly,
traditional kinship bears them only indirectly.
138.
Hellman, supra note 104, at 2.
139.
Id. at 5–6.
140.
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (emphasis added). On this point, Hellman observes
that “[t]he opinion’s authors probably used the term ‘inherently’ both for emphasis and to
forestall any attempts to show that particular children in particular schools were not affected
by the stigma.” Hellman, supra note 104, at 9.
141.
Hellman, supra note 104, at 10.
142.
Id.
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parents directly without running afoul of the Constitution.143 On one view, de facto
parent statutes or doctrines are unfair because they burden non-traditional
parenthood with expressive projections that traditional (legal) parenthood would
never have to satisfy.
On another view, however, those statutes or doctrines are entirely sound
because the law burdens de facto parents with good reason. Stringent de facto
parenthood definitions protect the fundamental rights of legal parents to raise their
children in a way that they see fit. Absent a thick definition of what (or who) a de
facto parent is, any person could conceivably step in and intrude on a preexisting
parent–child relationship, one whose constitutional dimensions the Supreme Court
reaffirmed in Troxel v. Granville.144
Similarly, on one view, the law would burden non-traditional procreation
on an expressive level were it to prohibit, say, sperm banks from organizing
donors on the basis of race because it is normatively desirable to do so. Whereas
the law could never tell traditional procreators to procreate in race-neutral ways, it
might use the legal regulation of alternative procreation as an occasion to express
that normative ideal. While perhaps unfair—why should non-traditional
procreators have to sacrifice choice on the altar of race neutrality?—one might
argue that our societal commitments to colorblindness are so strong that they
trump our societal commitment to procreative freedom (assuming that we even
have such a commitment for those who procreate in non-traditional ways).
This is not to say, then, that equal protection is violated every time that
the law imposes a thick vision of intimate and family life onto non-traditional
kinship. Rather, it is simply to say that we need to be more attentive to the myriad
ways in which the legal regulation of marginal kinship presents an occasion for the
law to be expressive in a way that the Constitution would normally prohibit.
Sometimes, as in the case of de facto parenthood, the thick understanding of
intimate and family life that flows from the legal regulation of marginal kinship
will be justified. Other times, as in the case of exclusionary marriage laws, it will
not be. At the very least, the law must offer some justification—other than that it
can—for directly burdening non-traditional kinship, but not traditional kinship,
with normative projections.

CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that family law has overlooked a critical way in
which the law attempts to control intimate and family life and to establish an ideal
conception of it. By regulating at the margins, the law gives the state an
143.
See supra Part II.B.
144.
530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (striking down the State of
Washington’s version of a non-parent visitation statute because its expansiveness intruded
on the fundamental right of the legal parent to make custodial and visitation decisions with
respect to her children). The Troxel Court reaffirmed the fundamental right that exists
between child and (legal) parent, observing that “there will normally be no reason for the
State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children,”
including the sorts of custodial and visitation decisions at issue in that case. Id. at 68–69.
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opportunity to regulate all of us. In addition, this Article has contended that
marginal regulation sometimes raises serious constitutional concerns.
This Article recognizes that the law regulates indirectly that which it
cannot regulate directly all of the time. For instance, while the law cannot tell legal
parents how to act,145 it can regulate the parent–child relationship through the law
of custody, which privileges one kind of parent–child relationship over another,146
and through the criminal law, which imposes criminal liability on those parents
who act unreasonably in certain instances.147 Moreover, the criminal law indirectly
communicates normative kinship preferences by extending privileges to certain
kinds of families but not to others.148 Finally, the criminal law advocates a certain
vision of the family by choosing which family-related activities to criminalize in
the first place.149
The objective of this Article, then, has not been to suggest that the legal
regulation of marginality is the only way that the law regulates intimate and family
life through the back door. Rather, its aim has been to uncover a neglected and
underappreciated form of back door regulation, one that could play an important
role in shoring up constitutional arguments regarding laws, like exclusionary
marriage regimes, that selectively and expressively burden non-traditional
relationships and practices.
In concluding, this Article invites readers to consider the wide-ranging
influence that the law has over everyone, and not just over those whom it directly
regulates. Opponents of same-sex marriage know this well, as their opposition to
same-sex marriage derives from a belief that marriage equality would directly
affect them even though they lack a particularized interest in that relationship

145.
Absent, of course, telling them not to inflict violence on their children in a
way that would amount to criminal abuse. Even here, however, every state extends to legal
parents the privilege of invoking the “parental discipline defense” in abuse prosecutions.
This defense “exempts parents from prosecutions for assault if the corporal punishment was
used to ‘benefit’ the child and if the nature of the punishment was objectively reasonable.”
MARKEL ET AL., supra note 49, at 9.
146.
See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 112, at 503 (“Custody law obliquely sets
standards for parental behavior and emphasizes the centrality of children’s interests.”).
147.
See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 49, at 66–69 (discussing parental
responsibility laws).
148.
See id. at 60 (“When the state makes choices regarding families and uses the
criminal justice system to send normative signals about those choices, it risks marginalizing
persons who consider themselves family members but are not recognized as such by the
state or other institutions.”).
149.
See id. at 77–78 (discussing the way in which family law burdens in the
criminal justice system operate to promote the law’s normative vision of the family from an
ex ante perspective); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and
the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1279 (2009) (discussing the
ways in which criminal and family law alike have “construct[ed] a normative ideal of
intimate life and provid[ed] the substantive content for this vision”).
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(other than that same-sex marriage offends them on any number of moral
grounds).150
Proponents of marriage equality have been less successful in driving this
point home. Rather than argue that discriminatory marriage regimes—predicated
as they so often are on an image of the nuclear family as procreative and
biological—affect everyone, they have focused instead on the harm that same-sex
couples experience individually. But as this Article has demonstrated, laws that
purport to target one class (e.g., same-sex couples) also indirectly target—and may
even influence—another class (e.g., opposite-sex couples). To overlook this
phenomenon is to miss just how expansive the law is when it regulates, as well as
just how interconnected to each other the law’s regulation—and, as the Supreme
Court acknowledged in Loving v. Virginia, its discrimination—makes us.151

150.
The “harm” that the general public would suffer by same-sex marriage was
the source of a recent cartoon in The New Yorker. In it, the cartoonist, Robert Mankoff,
depicts a wife in her mid-50s walking out the door of her house with two suitcases in hand.
Presumably in response to her husband’s question why she is leaving him, she answers:
“There’s nothing wrong with our marriage, but the spectre of gay marriage has hopelessly
eroded the institution.” Robert Mankoff, Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER, July 26, 2004, at 30.
151.
In Loving, the Supreme Court well understood the expansive reach of racial
discrimination when it observed that everyone bore the burden of the state’s racial
prejudice—not just those most immediately affected by it. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (stating that to deny the right to marry “on so unsupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the
State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law” (emphasis added)).

